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ABSTRACT 
 
The merits of expanding or restricting access to consumer credit are hotly 
debated. I examine some effects of restricting access, using household survey data 
on payday loan users collected around a policy change that imposed binding 
restrictions on loan terms in Oregon but not in Washington. The results suggest 
that the policy change decreased short-term borrowing in Oregon relative to 
Washington, with many Oregon payday borrowers shifting into plausibly inferior 
substitutes. Oregon respondents were also significantly more likely to experience 
an adverse change in financial condition. The results suggest that restricting 
access to consumer credit hinders productive investment and/or consumption 
smoothing, at least over the short-term. 
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1I. Introduction 
The merits of expanding or restricting access to consumer credit are hotly debated. The 
worldwide use of microcredit to fight poverty by expanding credit access typically focuses on 
financing “productive” microentrepreneurship rather than “unproductive consumption”.
1 Market 
forces have spurred explosive growth in subprime nonmortgage consumer credit in the U.S.— 
there are now more outlets offering small, two-week “payday loans” at 400% APR
2  t h a n  
MacDonald’s’ and Starbucks combined-– even as many jurisdictions enact discouraging 
regulations. At least 12 states currently have binding restrictions on payday loan terms. Ohio 
enacted its restrictions in 2008, and several more states are considering legislation that would 
restrict access. A binding federal interest rate cap on loans to military households took effect in 
2007, and Presidential candidate Barack Obama seeks to “Cap Outlandish Interest Rates on 
Payday Loans” by extending that cap and all Americans.
3 
Recent work on intertemporal choice suggests that usury ceilings may actually improve 
market efficiency. Interest rate caps (and borrowing restrictions more generally) can improve 
welfare if consumers have behavioral biases that induce overborrowing.
4 Incomplete insurance 
markets can also motivate rate ceilings even in the absence of behavioral biases.
5 
My paper does not test competing theories of intertemporal choice but rather adds to the 
related literature providing reduced-form evidence on the effects of access to expensive credit. 
Several prior studies find that, on average, expensive consumer loans help borrowers smooth 
negative shocks (Morse 2007; Wilson et al. 2008), make productive investments in job retention 
(Karlan and Zinman 2008), or better manage liquidity to alleviate financial distress (Morgan and 
Strain 2008). Several other studies find that increased access to expensive credit increases 
financial distress (Melzer 2007; Campbell et al. 2008; Skiba and Tobacman 2008a) and/or poor 
job performance (Carrell and Zinman 2008). 
                                                 
1 See Karlan and Zinman (2008) for a discussion. 
2 Payday loans typically extend a few hundred dollars in return for a check post-dated to borrower’s next 
pay date in the amount of the loan principal + a finance charge of at least $15 per $100. See Section II for 
details on the product and the market. 
3 http://www.barackobama.com/issues/economy/. To my knowledge Presidential candidate John McCain 
has not formalized a position on payday loans as of this writing. 
4 Behavioral biases may produce borrowing that is excessive relative to a normative benchmark, working 
through preferences  (Skiba and Tobacman 2008b), cost perceptions (Stango and Zinman 2008), and/or 
expectations (Brunnermeier and Parker 2005; Browning and Tobacman 2007). 
5 Glaeser and Scheinkman (1998) provide theory and evidence supporting this view. Benmelech and 
Moskowitz (2008) study the adoption of U.S. state usury laws in the 19
th century and find that they are 
motivated by rent-seeking, not efficiency considerations. 
2I examine the effects of restricting access to expensive consumer credit using household 
survey data
6 collected around new binding restrictions imposed by the state of Oregon in 2007 
(the “Cap”, below). The neighboring state of Washington considered enacting a similar 
restrictions but did not. Before- and after-Cap panel data, on a sample of Oregon and Washington 
respondents who were payday borrowers before-Cap, motivates difference-in-differences (DD) 
estimates of the effects of the cap (and of access to expensive credit more generally) on borrower 
choices and outcomes. Several issues complicate the estimation. Dissimilarities across treatment 
(Oregon) and control (Washington) groups in baseline characteristics and attrition motivate 
matching and weighting estimators in addition to simple means comparisons. The short-run 
follow-up period (5 months) and trend in lender exit motivate attempts to identify Oregon 
respondents who were most affected (i.e., most likely rationed) by the Cap. Overall the results are 
qualitatively robust to various DD estimation strategies. 
I find that the Cap dramatically reduced access to payday loans in Oregon, and that former 
payday borrowers responded by shifting into incomplete and plausibly inferior substitutes. Most 
substitution seems to occur through checking account overdrafts of various types and/or late bills. 
These alternative sources of liquidity can be quite costly in both direct terms (overdraft and late 
fees) and indirect terms (loss of checking account, criminal charges, utility shutoff). Under the 
broadest measure of liquidity in the data the likelihood of any expensive short-term borrowing 
fell by 9 percentage points in Oregon relative to Washington following the Cap. This jibes with 
perceptions, elicited in the baseline survey, that close substitutes for payday loans are lacking. 
Next I examine the effects of the Cap on the summary measures of financial condition that 
are available in the data: employment status, and respondents’ qualitative assessments of recent 
and future financial situations.
7 Estimates on individual outcomes are noisy but consistent with 
large declines in financial condition. Estimates on a summary measure of any adverse outcome— 
being unemployed, experiencing a recent decline in financial condition, or expecting a future 
decline in financial condition— suggest large and significant deterioration in the financial 
condition of Oregon respondents relative to their Washington counterparts.
8 As such the results 
suggest that restricting access to consumer credit hinders productive investment and/or 
consumption smoothing, at least over the short-term. 
                                                 
6 The survey was funded by the Consumer Credit Research Foundation, which itself is funded by payday 
loan industry sources. Please see Section IV for more details on survey design and data collection. 
7 Karlan and Zinman (2008) find that treatment effects on quantitative and qualitative measures of 
household well-being are positively correlated; see Section VI for more details. See Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006) for a more general discussion of subjective well-being measures and their uses. 
8 The impact studies cited above also find evidence consistent with large treatment-on-the-treated effects. 
3The paper proceeds with a brief overview of the payday loan market. Section III then details 
the Oregon policy change and subsequent lender exit. Section IV describes the sample frame and 
survey data. Section V details my approaches to estimating treatment effects and related threats to 
identification. Section VI presents the main results: estimates of the five-month impacts of the 
Cap on credit access, credit use, and financial condition. Section VII discusses how and why 
longer-run impacts might differ, and presents results using predicted-rationed Oregon respondents 
as the treatment group, and Washington payday borrowers in the follow-up period as the control 
group. Section VIII concludes with a brief discussion of directions for future research. 
 
II. The Payday Loan Market: Some Background 
In a standard payday loan contract the lender advances the borrower $100-$300
9 in return for a 
post-dated check, dated to coincide with the borrower’s next paycheck, in the amount of $115-
$345. The market rate is about $15 per $100 advanced (390% APR for a 2-week loan), although 
fees as high as $30 per $100 are not uncommon.
10 Nearly all transactions are face-to-face in retail 
outlets, although internet lending is growing.
11 
Payday lending has grown explosively in the U.S. since the early 1990s and is now prevalent. 
The market barely existed in the early 1990s; there are now over 20,000 lending outlets (Stephens 
Inc. 2007).
12 As others have noted, this means that there are now more payday lending outlets in 
the U.S. than McDonalds’ and Starbucks combined.
13 Micro data on payday borrowers is limited, 
but the available evidence suggests that perhaps 5 to 7 percent of the U.S. population has used a 
payday loan, with very prevalent serial borrowing (Tanik 2005; Stegman 2007). Many (potential) 
payday borrowers are served by social welfare programs like Food Stamps and the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, and annual payday loan volume of $40-$50 billion now exceeds the annual 
amount  transferred by these programs.
14 The potential payday market comprises perhaps 10% of 
U.S. households (Stephens Inc. 2007). Payday borrowers must have documented steady 
employment and a checking account. They generally face severe credit constraints, and have poor 
                                                 
9 Stegman (2007) estimates that 80% of payday loans are for $300 or less, and much of the information in 
this section draws on his overview of the industry. See also Barr (2004) and Caskey (1994; 2005). 
10 See Flannery and Samolyk (2005), DeYoung and Phillips (2006), and Skiba and Tobacman (2007) for 
evidence on competition, pricing, and profitability in the payday loan industry. 
11 Stephens Inc. (2007) estimates that Internet payday lending is growing at 40% annually and comprised 
12% of total volume in 2006. 
12 Most payday lenders are non-depository institutions. Many are check-cashers (“multi-line” lenders), but 
stand-alone (“mono-line”) lenders are common as well. 
13 The McDonald’s 2007 annual report shows U.S. 13,862 restaurants at year-end 2007. Horovitz (2006) 
reports that Starbucks had 7,950 U.S. stores during 2006; a graph in the 2006 Starbucks annual report (p. 
16) suggests a comparable number. 
14 The fiscal year 2007 costs of the Food Stamp and EITC programs were $33 billion and $38 billion. 
4credit histories and household annual incomes (well) below $50,000.
15 
The closest substitute for a payday loan is arguably overdraft protection on a bank account 
(Stegman 2007; Morgan and Strain 2008).
16 Other expensive loan products require collateral 
(pawn, auto title, subprime home equity), a durable purchase (rent-to-own), or are available only 
once a year (tax refund anticipation). 
Section IV will describe some baseline characteristics and borrowing behavior for my sample 
of payday borrowers. First I present some details on the Oregon Cap. 
 
III. The Oregon Policy Change and Lender Exit 
The Oregon policy change (the “Cap” hereafter) constrained the set of permissible terms on 
consumer loans under $50,000. Effective July 1, 2007 the maximum combination of finance 
charges and fees that can be charged to Oregon borrowers is approximately $10 per $100, with a 
minimum loan term of 31 days (for a maximum APR of 150%). These are plausibly binding 
restrictions on payday lenders that were typically charging at least 390% APR pre-Cap (e.g., $15 
per $100 on two week loans, where the loan term is synched to the borrower’s pay period). The 
restrictions appear to be closely enforced by Oregon regulators.
17  
Payday lenders have responded by exiting Oregon. Data from the Consumer and Business 
Services Department, Division of Finance and Corporate Securities (DFCS), indicates that there 
were 346 licensed outlets on December 31, 2006, 6 months prior to the effective date of the Cap. 
This count dropped to 105 licensed outlets in February 2008 (7 months after the effective date), 
and further to 82 licensed outlets by September 2008.  
The State of Washington has also considered restricting loan terms in recent years
18 but has 
ultimately left the relevant laws unchanged as of this writing. Washington still permits $15 per 
$100 on loan amounts up to $500, with no minimum loan term. 
                                                 
15 None of the studies cited in the Introduction has national data on borrowing or extensive detail on 
borrower characteristics; the evidence cited above comes from Stegman’s review of descriptive studies of 
payday borrowers. See also Brown and Cushman (2006). 
16 Bouncing checks is quite costly due to insufficient funds and return check fees, the potential for criminal 
charges, and negative effects on the credit score (CheckSys) banks use to screen applicants for a deposit 
account (Campbell et al. 2008). With overdraft protection a bank pays overdrawn checks rather than 
returning them. In exchange the bank often charges the account holder a $20 to $30 fee. Hence in many 
cases getting a payday loan is cheaper than overdrawing the checking account (particularly if the account 
holder runs the risk of overdrawing multiple checks). 
17The DFCS licenses and supervises payday lenders, responding to consumer complaints and conducting 
routine examinations of licensees at least every two years. The DFCS has taken several enforcement 
actions against payday lenders in the past; see, e.g., 
http://www.cbs.state.or.us/dfcs/securities/enf/orders/cf_enforcement_orders_index.html. 
18 See H.B. 1817 in 2008, several bills in 2007, and the 2006 hearing described in 
http://www.pliwatch.org/news_article_061213B.html . Introduced legislation is tracked and summarized by 
5 
IV. Sample Frame and Descriptive Statistics 
I use data from two phone surveys of Oregon and Washington respondents who were payday 
borrowers prior to the effective date of the Oregon Cap. The data collection was funded by the 
Consumer Credit Research Foundation, an organization that is itself funded by payday lenders. 
 
A. Sample Frame and Resulting Samples 
The baseline (“before” Cap) surveys were conducted between June 22 and July 11, 2007. The 
sample frame for the surveys was drawn from four major payday lenders and included all 
borrowers who had obtained loans in the prior three months. The lenders provided names and 
contact information to a survey firm, which randomly drew 17,940 clients (stratifying by state of 
residence). The survey firm tried to reach each of these clients by phone to complete a short 
survey of “opinions and experiences with short-term credit services”. Baseline surveys were 
completed with 6% of the sample frame (7% in Oregon, 5% in Washington), creating a study 
sample of 1,040 payday borrowers. 873 agreed to be contacted for the follow-up survey, with a 
small and insignificant difference between Oregon and Washington respondents. 
The follow-up (“after”) Cap surveys were conducted about five months later, between 
November 19 and December 2. The survey firm reached 400 of the 873 baseline respondents who 
agreed to be contacted for the follow-up survey (46%), with 200 respondents each in Oregon and 
Washington. 
 
B. Sample Characteristics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on nearly all of the information collected from the 1,040 
respondents to the baseline survey. 
Respondents report using their payday loan proceeds for bills, emergencies, food/groceries, 
and other debt service. Only 6% say “shopping or entertainment”. Self-reported outside options 
appear to be thin; when asked “if a payday loan had not been available… what was your second 
choice to obtain money?”, 70% responded with “none” or “don’t know”. Only 5% replied that a 
payday lender in another state or online would be their second choice, and only 8% stated “bank” 
or “credit union” (although it is not obvious that respondents would think of checking account 
overdrafts as a source of liquidity). 15% gave more evident potential substitutes (pawn shop, 
credit card, or car title loan) as their hypothetical 2
nd choice. 
                                                                                                                                                 
the National Conference of State Legislatures at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/banking/paydaylend-
intro.htm#Bills . 
6In keeping with the prior studies of payday borrowers summarized in Section II, the 
households in my sample have low-to-moderate income (nearly 50% report total household 
income between $20,000 and $50,000). 50% of respondents have educational attainment of a high 
school degree or less. The mean age is about 47, and over 60% of borrowers are female. Less 
than 50% are married, and the mean number of dependents is only slightly above one.
19 The 
remaining variables in Table 1 are outcomes that might be measurably affected by the contraction 
of payday credit in Oregon, and I discuss them in Section VI below. 
 
V. Identification 
In this section I focus on issues related to identifying short-run average effects of the Oregon 
interest rate cap on household financial condition. I defer discussion of longer-run and 
heterogeneous and effects until Section VII. 
The surveys described in Section IV were designed with a difference-in-differences (DD) 
estimation strategy in mind for estimating the effects of the Oregon cap on borrowing behavior, 
employment status, and qualitative assessments of financial well-being (I detail each outcome of 
interest in Section VI below). There is before- and after-Cap data from Oregon (the “treated” 
state) and Washington (the “control” state), suggesting that one might obtain unbiased estimates 
of the Oregon policy change by differencing 5-month changes in the outcomes for Oregon 
respondents from 5-month changes for Washington respondents. Since the treatment varies at the 
state level, and I have data from only two states, I simply calculate differences using the state 
mean for each variable of interest, allowing the variance to differ across states. A DD estimator 
will produce unbiased estimates of the Cap’s average effects under the assumption of no 
differential trends in the outcomes of interest across Oregon and Washington.
20 
Table 1 highlights two potential symptoms of violations of the DD identifying assumption. 
One symptom is some observable dissimilarities between Oregon and Washington respondents in 
the baseline data; baseline differences in observables may indicate proclivities toward differential 
unobserved trends in the outcomes. Column 3 shows that the Oregon and Washington 
respondents differ significantly in reported loan purpose, perceived outside options, education, 
income, marital history, internet access, employment status, and financial outlook. Another 
symptom is differential attrition across the two states. Columns 4 and 5 (7 and 8) take the 520 
baseline respondents in Oregon (Washington) and report survey variables separately for those 
                                                 
19 The Oregon/Washington surveys did not inquire about race or homeownership status. 
20 The general DD identifying assumption is no unobserved trends that differ by treatment status; my 
sample has at most two data points on each subject and hence any trend is unobserved. 
7who completed a follow-up survey (Columns 4 and 7) and those who attrited (Columns 5 and 8). 
Column 6 (Column 9) then reports the estimated difference between survivors and attriters for 
Oregon (Washington). Comparing Columns 6 and 9 suggests that attrition may have been 
correlated with several outcomes of interest. 
I address the potential confounds raised by observable differences and differential attrition by 
constructing weights designed to balance the sample. I attempt to make the Oregon survivors 
representative of the Oregon baseline sample by predicting survival (s) among Oregon 
respondents using baseline characteristics, and then weighting Oregon respondents by 1/s when 
estimating a DD. This puts more weight on respondents in the follow-up survey who are 
observably similar to the attriters, and permits valid inference if attrition is not correlated with the 
treatment and the outcome.
21 I then balance Washington and Oregon respondents by estimating a 
propensity score p for being an Oregon respondent, using baseline characteristics on all Oregon 
and surviving Washington respondents, and then weighting Washington respondents by p/(1-p) 
when estimating a DD. This weight balances the survivor sample on observable characteristics, 
thereby maximizing the observable similarity between treatment (Oregon) and control 
(Washington), and hopefully minimizing the likelihood of differential trends. 
 
VI. Main Results: Five-Month Average Treatment Effects of the Oregon Cap 
A. Effects on the use of Payday Loans and Substitutes 
Table 2 present estimates of the Cap’s effects on the use of payday loans and several potential 
substitutes. For reference, columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) present baseline and follow-up means for 
Oregon (Washington) subjects who responded to both surveys. Columns 5-7 present difference-
in-differences (DD) estimates of the five-month average treatment effects on borrowing. Column 
5 estimates the DD without any adjustment for matching or attrition. Column 6 weights to adjust 
for attrition and other observable differences (as detailed in Section V), dropping observations in 
the top percentile of weights in each state to reduce the influence of outliers. Column 7 weights 
without dropping outliers. 
The first row shows that the likelihood of recent payday borrowing in Oregon fell by 24 to 29 
percentage points relative to Washington, after the Cap. The unweighted likelihood fell from 1 to 
0.79 in Washington, and from 1 to 0.51 in Oregon. Subsequent rows explore the degree to which 
former payday borrowers in Oregon substituted other sources of credit. 
                                                 
21 E.g., say the rate cap restricts access to payday credit in Oregon and thereby worsens financial condition. 
If survey response is negatively correlated with financial condition, then declines in financial condition will 
be underrepresented in the survey, and estimates of the treatment effect will be biased upward (downward 
in absolute value). 
8I first look at potential alternative sources of liquidity one-by-one. The use of a specific 
alternative will rise in Oregon relative to Washington if it is a close-enough substitute; 
conversely, use of the alternative will fall if it and payday borrowing are complements. There is 
little evidence of a significant effect on auto title or credit card cash advance borrowing. The 
baseline prevalence of these products is low in both Oregon and Washington (Columns 1 and 3), 
and the DDs (Columns 5-7) do not find significant increases from baseline to follow-up in 
Oregon relative Washington. But the DD confidence intervals are large on these and all other 
outcomes, so that insignificant results are not precise zeros. 
The sign pattern for the next three outcomes (has a bank overdraft line of credit, bounced a 
check, bounced two or more checks in the last three months) suggests the possibility of a shift to 
checking account overdrafts. But again none of the DDs are significant. Interestingly, many more 
respondents use paid overdrafts or bounced checks as a source of liquidity than auto title or credit 
card cash advances (Columns 1-4). The likelihood of any late bill payment in the last three 
months is very high (75% or greater). This likelihood drops significantly in Oregon relative 
Washington in the unweighted DD (Column 5), but not in the weighted DDs (Columns 6 and 7). 
The likelihood of frequent late bill payments ranges from 19 to 30 percent in the baseline and 
follow-up samples (Columns 1-4); the DD point estimates here are all negative but none are 
significant. 
The next four rows of Table 2 estimate DDs for increasingly inclusive measures of any recent 
borrowing (from “loans” only, to loans + checking overdrafts + late bills). Given the reduction in 
payday credit we expect total borrowing to fall unless alternative sources of liquidity are perfect 
substitutes. The results on any “loans only” in the last three months again suggest that credit card 
cash advances and auto title loans are very poor substitutes for payday loans (the DD for any 
“loan” is about the same as the DD for payday borrowing alone). This meshes with the results on 
title loans and cash advances individually, and with the baseline assessments of payday loan 
alternatives (less than 10% of borrowers reported that a title loan or cash advance would be their 
second choice if they could not get a payday loan). 
Checking account overdrafts of various types and/or late bill payment seem to be more likely, 
but imperfect, substitutes for rationed payday credit. The DDs on these more inclusive measures 
of borrowing are less than half of the DDs on payday borrowing alone. There several reasons why 
overdrafts and late bills may be imperfect, and inferior, substitutes for payday loans. Overdrafts 
are often more expensive than payday loans in pure pecuniary terms: fees are often $25-$35 per 
transaction (Campbell et al. 2008). Repeated overdrafts or bounced checks can lead to the loss of 
checking account privileges (Campbell et al report 6.4 million involuntary closures nationwide in 
92005) and criminal charges (Morgan and Strain 2008). Late bills can also produce substantial 
costs (late fees, utility shutoffs, reactivation fees, credit score declines). 
The last row of Table 2 shows that the proportion of Oregon respondents reporting that it was 
harder to get a short-term loan recently rose by 18 to 22 percentage points relative to Washington. 
So by any measure the survey data shows that overall borrowing has fallen substantially in 
Oregon relative to Washington post-Cap. 
The welfare implications of these results are unclear, as they hinge on one’s underlying 
model of consumer choice. If consumers are neoclassical (traditionally rational) then of course 
the Cap reduces welfare for Oregon households by removing an option for which there is no 
perfect substitute. If consumers are behavioral then reducing access to payday loans (and thereby 
to liquidity more generally) may prevent overborrowing; hence the credit reductions we see in 
Table 2 may benefit Oregon households. The data do not permit direct tests of these competing 
hypotheses and I turn to other outcomes for clues. 
 
B. Effects on Employment, and Qualitative Assessments of Financial Condition 
Table 3 presents estimates of the Cap’s effects on employment status and qualitative assessments 
of financial condition. As in Table 2: Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) present baseline and follow-up 
means for Oregon (Washington) subjects who responded to both surveys. Columns 5-7 present 
difference-in-differences (DD) estimates of the five-month average treatment effects. Column 5 
estimates the DD without any adjustment for matching or attrition. Column 6 weights to adjust 
for attrition and other observable differences (as detailed in Section V), dropping observations in 
the top percentile of weights in each state to reduce the influence of outliers. Column 7 weights 
without dropping outliers. 
Proponents of payday loans argue that even expensive credit can be quite productive if it 
enables borrowers to avoid missing work (and thereby losing daily wages or their jobs). The loan 
purpose self-reports are consistent with this story: 31% of borrowers report financing emergency 
needs like auto repair or medical expenses. Here I look directly at employment status (the 
survey’s measure of income is too coarse to use as an outcome measure).
22 The weighted and 
unweighted DD point estimates on two measures of unemployment or underemployment are all 
positive, which is consistent with the hypothesis that reducing payday loan access in Oregon 
hindered productive investments or consumption smoothing that facilitated job retention (or 
search). But the estimates here are severely underpowered: given the low baseline prevalence of 
                                                 
22 Karlan and Zinman (2008) find large positive effects of randomized access to 200% APR consumer loans  
on job retention and income 6-12 months later, in South Africa. 
10unemployment (12%) and the sample size, the effects on unemployment would have to be quite 
large to be statistically significant. 
Next I examine respondents’ overall assessments of their financial situation in the past six 
months, and of their prospects for the future. Using qualitative summary measures of financial 
condition is attractive given the difficulty of measuring overall (or even financial) well-being, 
particularly in short surveys. Karlan and Zinman (2008) find positive treatment effects of 
expensive credit access for both qualitative and quantitative measures of financial condition.
23 
Michigan Surveys of Consumers show robust positive correlations between respondent 
expectations of their overall financial situation a year from now, and their expectations of income 
a year from now.
24 So it seems plausible that qualitative assessments are positively correlated 
with actual financial well-being. Perhaps surprisingly, these measures indicate low levels  of 
recent or expected deterioration in financial condition (Columns 1-4). Less than 20% say that 
their situation has been getting worse, and less than 10% expect their situation to get worse in the 
future. 
The DD point estimates on these qualitative assessments suggest that the Cap produced 
declines in financial condition for Oregon respondents relative to their Washington counterparts. 
The proportion of respondents saying their financial situation had been getting worse in the last 6 
months increased by 6 to 9 percentage points in Oregon relative to Washington, but the estimates 
are very imprecise. The proportion saying that they expect their financial situation to get worse in 
the future increased significantly, by 5 or 6 percentage points, in Oregon relative to Washington. 
The last row of Table 3 shows large and significant relative increases in the proportion of 
Oregon respondents reporting any adverse outcome: being unemployed, assessing recent financial 
situation as getting worse, or assessing future financial prospects as worse. E.g., the unweighted 
proportion increased from 0.28 to 0.35 for Oregon respondents, while declining from 0.31 to 0.26 
for Washington respondents, for a DD of 12 percentage points (Column 5). The weighted DDs 
produce similar estimates (13 and 15 percentage points). These magnitudes imply large 
treatment-on-the-treated effects of access to expensive credit; in keeping with prior impact 
studies. 
 
                                                 
23 The quantitative outcomes include job retention and income; and going to bed hungry in the last month. 
The qualitative outcomes are a “control and outlook” index of self-assessed control over household 
resources and decisions, optimism, and socio-economic status; and an ordinal measure of changes in food 
quality over the past year. 
24 Source: author’s tabulations from Michigan surveys from 2006 and 2007. Correlations range from 0.18 
to 0.25 throughout the income distribution. 
11C. Another Outcome: Phone Disconnects 
Another outcome that might be of interest is the proportion of phone lines that are disconnected. I 
do not include this in the summary measure of adverse outcomes because phone disconnects 
might well be correlated with productive investments (e.g., moves to a better residence, change 
from landline to cell phone) rather than adverse outcomes like financial distress or eviction. 
I estimate a DD for phone disconnects using information from the survey sample frame as 
well as from the survey sample itself. Among the survey sample frame of 17,940 borrowers 
called for the baseline survey, 18.6% of Oregon lines and 29.3% of Washington lines were 
disconnected, for difference of -10.7 percentage points (with a standard error of 0.006). The 
second difference comes from the follow-up survey sample frame. Everyone who completed a 
baseline survey had a working phone (since it was a phone survey!) Of the 873 borrowers who 
agreed to be contacted for the follow-up survey 16.6% of Oregon respondents and 23.8% of 
Washington respondents had disconnected lines at the time of the follow-up survey, for a 
difference of -7.3 percentage points (with a standard error of 2.7). The difference between these 
two differences gives an imprecisely estimated 3.4 percentage point increase (standard error: 2.8) 
in Oregon disconnects relative to Washington. 
 
VII. Longer-Run Treatment Effects: Discussion and Exploratory Analysis 
The five-month results above suggest that the Oregon cap reduced the supply of credit for payday 
borrowers, and that the financial condition of borrowers (as measured by employment status and 
qualitative assessments) suffered as a result. The longer-run impacts of policy initiatives to 
restrict credit access might differ from the five-month results for at least two reasons. 
First, the treatment effects of credit access might have gestation periods. The benefits of 
productive investments might not be realized for several months or years. The costs of 
systematically counterproductive loan uses (e.g., negative NPV investments borne of excessive 
optimism or biased underestimation of borrowing costs, time-inconsistent consumption splurges) 
might also take time to materialize, particularly if they compound through the channel of serial 
expensive borrowing and debt traps. The best way to address this issue is to collect outcomes data 
over longer horizons.
25 
A second issue is that short-run measures may capture transitional rather than equilibrium 
outcomes. Borrowers may need time to adjust to the new regime (e.g., to find substitutes that 
                                                 
25 Administrative data may complement survey data here; e.g., Karlan and Zinman examine treatment 
effects on credit scores one and two years after treatment (to complement the short-run survey outcomes) 
and find that increased access increased the likelihood of having a score, and had no effect on the score 
conditional on having one. 
12blunt the effects of restricted payday loan access). Lenders may also take time to adjust their 
supply response. This has been the case in Oregon; as documented in Section III, lenders exited 
after the effective date of the cap, but payday credit has not completely dried up. Recall that 50% 
of Oregon respondents had a payday loan in the follow-up survey. And per the new regulation, 
these Oregon borrowers were using a product that was cheaper (150% APR) and longer-term 
(minimum 31 days) than their Washington counterparts. So short-term credit access may have 
actually  improved for some Oregon borrowers. The challenge for interpreting the average 
treatment effects is that these borrowers are pooled with “already-rationed” former borrowers 
who can not get a payday loan as a result of the cap.
26 The effects on already-rationed 
respondents may provide a better indication of longer-term impacts, particularly if payday lenders 
continue to exit. 
I estimate effects on already-rationed respondents by defining new treatment and control 
groups. I set the treatment group by predicting would-be Oregon payday borrowers in the follow-
up period (i.e., respondents who would have gotten payday loans in the absence of the Cap),
27 and 
flagging those who did not actually get a loan. There are 76 such predicted already-rationed 
borrowers. I then estimate DDs for this treatment group using the 157 Washington respondents 
who were payday borrowers in the follow-up period as the control group. 
Table 4 Panel A shows DD estimates on the summary borrowing outcomes for the already-
rationed. Column 5 uses the simple means comparisons, and Columns 6 and 7 weight to adjust for 
differential attrition and baseline characteristics across treatment and control. As expected, the 
declines in overall borrowing in Oregon relative to Washington are larger here, among the 
predicted already-rationed, than in the full sample (compare to Table 2). Panel B shows DDs on 
employment status and the qualitative assessments of financial condition. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the full sample (compare to Table 3) but not precise enough to identify 
anything but very large differences in effect sizes. 
 
                                                 
26 Strictly speaking the Oregon borrowers in the follow-up survey may be rationed as well, on the intensive 
margin and/or on the extensive margin (given that the survey looks back over the prior three months). 
27 Specifically, I estimate the likelihood of payday borrowing for Washington respondents in the follow-up 
survey using baseline characteristics. The I use the coefficients to predict counterfactual (i.e.,. in the 
absence of the Cap) payday borrowing for Oregon respondents in the follow-up survey, using their baseline 
characteristics. I define Oregon respondents with a predicted probability of > 0.5 as the would-be 
borrowers. This produces a would-be borrowing rate of 78% in Oregon, as compared to the actual 
borrowing rate of 79% in Washington. 
13VIII. Conclusion 
I examine some effects of restricting access to expensive consumer credit on payday loan 
users, using household survey data collected around the imposition of binding restrictions on 
loan terms in Oregon but not in Washington. The results suggest that the policy change 
decreased expensive short-term borrowing in Oregon relative to Washington, with many 
Oregon payday borrowers shifting into plausibly inferior substitutes. Oregon respondents 
were also significantly more likely to experience an adverse change in financial condition. 
The results suggest that restricting access to consumer credit hinders productive investment 
and/or consumption smoothing, at least over the short-term. 
Much work remains to address the questions of whether largely unfettered access to 
expensive credit improves (consumer) welfare, and why. 
The likelihood of additional policy changes at the state (and possibly federal) level seems 
high, suggesting that difference-in-differences (DD) approaches like the one used in this 
paper will continue to be useful. Future studies would benefit from larger sample sizes and a 
richer set of proxies for consumer welfare and financial condition. Viable examples of 
proxies to collect from household surveys include postponed medical care and forced moves 
as used by Melzer (2007), shutoffs of heat or other utilities, dunning as used by Morgan and 
Strain (2008), and hunger and subjective well-being as used by Karlan and Zinman (2008). 
Future studies would also do well to track outcomes of interest over longer horizons, since 
the costs and benefits of investment and consumption smoothing activities may have 
gestation periods, or compound over time. 
Finally, it is critical to begin reconciling findings across different studies. Are the 
differences due to methodology or economic context? Field experiments randomized at the 
individual level would help, by providing clean variation in credit access and more statistical 
power than state-level natural experiments. Additional data collection on a richer set of 
outside options (for borrowing and economic activity) and decision inputs (for intertemporal 
choice models) would help address whether heterogeneity across consumers and markets 
drives the results. 
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16Table 1. Sample Composition and Attrition: Means for Baseline Survey Responses
Respondent's state of residence: OR WA OR-WA
difference
Reached for follow-up survey? all all all in not in difference in not in difference
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
any payday loan last 3 months 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
agreed to be contacted for follow-up survey 0.848 0.831 0.017 1.000 0.753 0.247*** 1.000 0.725 0.275***
0.023 0.024 0.025
loan purpose: "regular bills like utilities, phone" 0.358 0.352 0.006 0.368 0.352 0.016 0.345 0.356 -0.011
0.030 0.044 0.044
loan purpose: "emergency need: car, medical, etc." 0.304 0.322 -0.018 0.290 0.313 -0.022 0.299 0.337 -0.038
0.029 0.042 0.043
loan purpose: "food/groceries" 0.189 0.138 0.051** 0.214 0.174 0.039 0.149 0.131 0.019
0.023 0.036 0.032
0.085 0.124 -0.039** 0.129 0.121 0.008 0.073 0.092 -0.020
0.019 0.030 0.025
loan purpose: "shopping or entertainment" 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.052 0.059 0.007 0.077 0.042 0.035
0.015 0.021 0.022
other option if no payday loan: none 0.487 0.443 0.045 0.487 0.489 -0.002 0.449 0.438 0.011
0.031 0.046 0.045
other option if no payday loan: not sure 0.215 0.285 -0.070*** 0.213 0.217 -0.004 0.263 0.300 -0.037
0.027 0.037 0.041
other option if no payday loan: pawn 0.067 0.080 -0.013 0.046 0.080 -0.034 0.101 0.066 0.035
0.016 0.023 0.025
reason payday loan vs. another source: "fast approval" 0.339 0.367 -0.028 0.323 0.350 -0.027 0.353 0.376 -0.023
0.031 0.044 0.045
reason payday loan: "more convenient location" 0.229 0.222 0.007 0.250 0.217 0.033 0.230 0.217 0.013
0.027 0.039 0.039
reason payday loan: "cheaper" 0.156 0.172 -0.016 0.141 0.167 -0.026 0.209 0.148 0.060*
0.024 0.034 0.035
highest education: no high school 0.104 0.083 0.021 0.109 0.095 0.014 0.090 0.078 0.012
0.018 0.028 0.025
highest education: high school 0.440 0.385 0.055* 0.457 0.431 0.026 0.340 0.415 -0.075*
0.031 0.045 0.044
highest education: some college 0.305 0.289 0.017 0.302 0.309 -0.007 0.310 0.275 0.035
0.029 0.042 0.041
highest education: college+ 0.151 0.243 -0.092*** 0.146 0.151 -0.005 0.260 0.232 0.028
0.025 0.032 0.039
income < $20,000 0.340 0.274 0.066** 0.370 0.320 0.051 0.281 0.269 0.012
0.030 0.045 0.042
income $20,000-$50,000 0.512 0.459 0.053 0.492 0.526 -0.034 0.454 0.462 -0.008
0.033 0.047 0.047
income > $50,000 0.148 0.267 -0.119*** 0.138 0.155 -0.017 0.265 0.269 -0.004
0.026 0.034 0.042
age 46.872 45.931 0.941 48.827 45.579 3.248** 47.209 45.097 2.211*
0.913 1.354 1.289
female 0.623 0.608 0.015 0.638 0.613 0.026 0.630 0.594 0.036
0.030 0.044 0.044
married 0.479 0.479 0.000 0.459 0.494 -0.035 0.482 0.477 0.005
0.032 0.046 0.046
never married 0.165 0.219 -0.054** 0.144 0.179 -0.035 0.193 0.235 -0.042
0.025 0.033 0.037
dependents 1.135 1.106 0.029 1.085 1.169 -0.083 1.135 1.088 0.048
0.093 0.139 0.132
internet access 0.645 0.722 -0.077*** 0.653 0.638 0.015 0.774 0.689 0.085**
0.029 0.043 0.040
harder get short-term loan last 3 months 0.165 0.059 0.106*** 0.158 0.170 -0.012 0.052 0.064 -0.012
0.020 0.035 0.022
any auto title loan in last 3 months 0.115 0.083 0.033* 0.085 0.134 -0.049* 0.085 0.081 0.004
0.019 0.027 0.025
any credit card cash advance in last 3 months 0.152 0.157 -0.005 0.180 0.135 0.045 0.176 0.146 0.030
0.023 0.033 0.034
has overdraft line of credit or bounce protection 0.506 0.457 0.049 0.543 0.484 0.059 0.428 0.475 -0.047
0.032 0.046 0.046
bounced a check in last 3 months 0.524 0.489 0.035 0.533 0.519 0.014 0.472 0.500 -0.028
0.031 0.045 0.046
bounced 2 or more checks in last 3 months 0.299 0.299 0.000 0.289 0.306 -0.016 0.254 0.328 -0.074*
0.029 0.042 0.041
any late bill in last 3 months 0.827 0.804 0.023 0.859 0.807 0.052 0.759 0.833 -0.074**
0.024 0.033 0.037
frequently paid bills late in last 3 months 0.280 0.241 0.039 0.293 0.272 0.021 0.226 0.251 -0.025
0.027 0.041 0.039
unemployed 0.125 0.116 0.009 0.125 0.125 0.000 0.131 0.106 0.026
0.020 0.030 0.029
not working 0.338 0.278 0.060** 0.380 0.313 0.068 0.288 0.272 0.015
0.029 0.043 0.041
unemployed or part-time work 0.219 0.182 0.037 0.235 0.209 0.026 0.222 0.157 0.065*
0.025 0.038 0.036
retired 0.204 0.151 0.053** 0.235 0.184 0.051 0.152 0.151 0.001
0.024 0.037 0.033
financial situation gotten worse last 6 months 0.186 0.192 -0.006 0.171 0.196 -0.025 0.181 0.199 -0.018
0.024 0.035 0.036
expect financial situation to get worse in future 0.045 0.031 0.014 0.046 0.045 0.001 0.061 0.013 0.048***
0.012 0.019 0.018
financial situation gotten worse, or expect to get worse 0.209 0.209 0.000 0.196 0.217 -0.021 0.219 0.202 0.017
0.025 0.037 0.037
expect financial situation to get better in future 0.768 0.833 -0.065*** 0.716 0.801 -0.086** 0.821 0.840 -0.018
0.025 0.039 0.034
phone disconnected 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000
number of observations 520 520 1040 200 320 200 320
Baseline (June/July 2007) survey responses only.
Cells report proportions or means, with standard error on difference in italics. Standard errors allow variance to differ across state or survey wave.
Observation counts for some variables are lower than reported in the bottom row, due to nonresponse.
OR WA
loan purpose: "pay credit card or other loan bills" or 
"mortgage/rent payment"
17Table 2. Borrowing: Analysis Sample Means and Estimates of Average Five-Month Treatment Effects
baseline follow-up baseline follow-up Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
any payday loan last 3 months 1 0.505 1 0.789 -0.284*** -0.294*** -0.241***
(0) (0.035) (0) (.029) (0.046) (0.054) (0.076)
N 200 200 199 199 399 395 399
any auto title loan in last 3 months 0.085 0.075 0.085 0.075 0.000 -0.049 -0.022
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.036) (0.051) (0.053)
N 200 200 199 199 399 395 399
any credit card cash advance in last 3 months 0.180 0.130 0.176 0.146 -0.020 0.015 0.013
(0.027) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.048) (0.055) (0.051)
N 200 200 199 199 399 395 399
has bank overdraft line of credit or bounce protection 0.541 0.519 0.432 0.400 0.011 0.066 0.061
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.044) (0.053) (0.050)
N 183 183 185 185 368 364 368
bounced a check, overdrafted, or insufficient funds 0.533 0.498 0.474 0.428 0.010 0.016 0.012
in last 3 months (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.053) (0.062) (0.058)
N 195 195 194 194 389 385 389
bounced or overdrafted twice or more in last 3 months 0.287 0.313 0.258 0.247 0.036 0.026 -0.050
(0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.049) (0.069) (0.095)
N 195 195 194 194 389 385 389
any late bill in last 3 months 0.857 0.745 0.756 0.761 -0.117** -0.008 -0.027
(0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.052) (0.060) (0.059)
N 196 196 197 197 393 390 393
frequently paid bills late in last 3 months 0.296 0.224 0.218 0.193 -0.046 -0.059 -0.042
(0.033) (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) (0.048) (0.072) (0.069)
N 196 196 197 197 393 390 393
used any short-term credit, "loans" only 1 0.570 1 0.830 -0.260*** -0.275*** -0.293***
in last 3 months (0) (0.035) (0) (0.027) (0.044) (0.049) (0.048)
N 200 200 200 200 400 396 400
used any short-term credit, including bounced checks/ 1 0.755 1 0.880 -0.125*** -0.114*** -0.117***
overdrafts/insufficient funds, in last 3 months (0) (0.030) (0) (0.023) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040)
N 200 200 200 200 400 396 400
used any short-term credit, including late bills, 1 0.835 1 0.950 -0.115*** -0.093*** -0.109***
in last 3 months (0) (0.026) (0) (0.015) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
N 200 200 200 200 400 396 400
used any short-term credit, including bounced checks,  1 0.870 1 0.960 -0.090*** -0.073*** -0.073***
etc. and late bills, in last 3 months (0) (0.024) (0) (0.014) (0.028) (0.027) (0.025)
N 200 200 200 200 400 396 400
harder get short-term loan last 3 months 0.158 0.388 0.045 0.090 0.185*** 0.177** 0.219***
(0.030) (0.040) (0.016) (0.021) (0.056) (0.073) (0.075)
N 152 152 178 178 330 326 330
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Standard errors, in parentheses, allow variance to differ across state.
Sample for each outcome includes only those who responded to the question in both rounds of the survey.
Columns 1-5 do not attempt to correct for attrition or for dissimilarity across OR and WA.
Columns 6 and 7 weight to correct for attrition and dissimilarity (see Section V of text for details), and Column 6 drops observations in the top 1 
percentile of weights.
Weighted
Oregon Washington Difference-in-Differences
18Table 3. Other Indicators of Financial Condition: Analysis Sample Means and Estimates of Average Five-Month Treatment Effects
baseline follow-up baseline follow-up Unweighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
unemployed 0.121 0.151 0.131 0.131 0.030 0.035 0.034
(0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.047) (0.043)
N 199 199 198 198 397 393 397
unemployed, or part-time work 0.231 0.256 0.222 0.182 0.066 0.049 0.047
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.027) (0.041) (0.052) (0.048)
N 199 199 198 198 397 393 397
"...describe your financial situation in last 6 months:" 0.172 0.207 0.181 0.156 0.060 0.085 0.070
getting worse (0.027) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.047) (0.068) (0.069)
N 198 198 199 199 397 393 397
0.046 0.066 0.061 0.036 0.046* 0.060** 0.056*
(0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) (0.027) (0.031) (0.029)
N 196 196 196 196 392 388 392
any adverse: unemployed, financial situation worse 0.279 0.345 0.313 0.262 0.117** 0.152** 0.134*
last 6 months, or expect worse in the future (0.032) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.055) (0.069) (0.071)
N 197 197 195 195 392 388 392
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Standard errors, in parentheses, allow variance to differ across state.
Sample for each outcome includes only those who responded to the question in both rounds of the survey.
Columns 1-5 do not attempt to correct for attrition or for dissimilarity across OR and WA.
"Thinking about the future, do you expect your financial 
situation to:" get worse
Columns 6 and 7 weight to correct for attrition and dissimilarity (see Section V of text for details), and Column 6 drops observations in the top 1 
percentile of weights.
Oregon Washington Difference-in-Differences
Weighted
19Table 4. Predicted-Rationed in Oregon vs. Washington Borrowers
baseline follow-up baseline follow-up Unweighted
Panel A. Borrowing (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
used any short-term credit, "loans" only 1 0.132 1 1 -0.868*** -0.858*** -0.863***
in last 3 months (0) (0.039) (0) (0) (0.039) (0.045) (0.044)
N 76 76 157 157 233 230 233
used any short-term credit, including bounced checks/ 1 0.474 1 1 -0.526*** -0.478*** -0.462***
overdrafts/insufficient funds, in last 3 months (0) (0.058) (0) (0) (0.058) (0.062) (0.062)
N 76 76 157 157 233 230 233
used any short-term credit, including late bills, 1 0.658 1 1 -0.342*** -0.305*** -0.295***
in last 3 months (0) (0.055) (0) (0) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
N 76 76 157 157 233 230 233
used any short-term credit, including bounced checks,  1 0.711 1 1 -0.289*** -0.247*** -0.239***
etc. and late bills, in last 3 months (0) (0.052) (0) (0) (0.052) (0.050) (0.049)
N 76 76 157 157 233 230 233
Panel B. Other Indicators of Financial Condition
unemployed 0.133 0.147 0.129 0.129 0.013 -0.002 -0.002
(0.040) (0.041) (0.027) (0.027) (0.053) (0.064) (0.061)
N 75 75 155 155 230 227 230
unemployed, or part-time work 0.187 0.187 0.206 0.174 0.032 0.004 -0.035
(0.045) (0.045) (0.033) (0.031) (0.053) (0.064) (0.071)
N 75 75 155 155 230 227 230
"...describe your financial situation in last 6 months": 0.133 0.227 0.160 0.154 0.100 0.099 0.096
getting worse (0.040) (0.049) (0.029) (0.029) (0.064) (0.092) (0.087)
N 75 75 156 156 231 228 231
0.040 0.067 0.058 0.045 0.039 0.026 0.024
(0.023) (0.029) (0.019) (0.017) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040)
N 75 75 156 156 231 228 231
any adverse: unemployed, financial situation worse 0.257 0.365 0.299 0.247 0.160** 0.142 0.137
last 6 months, or expect worse in the future (0.051) (0.056) (0.037) (0.035) (0.080) (0.099) (0.094)
N 74 74 154 154 228 225 228
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Standard errors, in parentheses, allow variance to differ across state.
Sample for each outcome includes only those who responded to the question in both rounds of the survey.
Columns 1-5 do not attempt to correct for attrition or for dissimilarity across OR and WA.
Oregon rationed households are those who are predicted to have a payday loan in the follow-up (based on baseline survey characteristics) 
but who do not actually have one (see Section V of text for details). There are 76 predicted rationed Oregon households in the follow-up 
survey, and 157 Washington borrowers.
"Thinking about the future, do you expect your financial 
situation to:" get worse
Columns 6 and 7 weight to correct for attrition and dissimilarity (see Section V of text for details), and Column 6 drops observations in the top 
1 percentile of weights.
Oregon Washington Difference-in-Differences
Weighted
20